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CHAPTER SIX

What "Community" Supplies

Robert J. Sampson

Community seems to be the modern elixir for much of what ails American society. Indeed, as we approach a new century and reflect on the wrenching social changes that have shaped our recent past, calls for a return to community values are everywhere. From politicians to private foundations to real estate developers to criminal justice officials to communitarians, the appeal of community is ubiquitous.

Consider just a few examples of the efforts to mobilize action under the rubric of community. Among private foundations many programs have settled on community as a conceptual umbrella to coordinate new initiatives.¹ Some of the most ambitious include those launched by the Ford Foundation's Neighborhood and Family Initiative and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's Program on Human and Community Development. Meanwhile the growing community development corporation (CDC) movement has long singled out community as a meaningful unit of social intervention to improve the lives of the poor.² In the criminal justice system the move to community-based strategies has included increased community policing, community-based prosecution policies, and community corrections.³ Perhaps surprisingly, even real estate developers are beginning to take heed of modern discontent with urban sprawl and suburban anonymity.⁴ They are proffering new visions of liv-

I thank Ron Ferguson, James Connell, and participants of the NCDPAN conference in Washington, November 1996, for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1. Brown (1996); and Chaskin (1996).
2. See chapter 1 in this volume; and Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan (1996).
3. Chapter 7; and National Institute of Justice (1996).
4. Grossman and Leroux (1996).

ing arrangements that promote neighborliness, local interaction, and common physical space with architectural integrity, all in an attempt to restore some semblance of community.⁵ And in intellectual discussions, the rise of communitarianism as a serious movement is centered on community responsibility and civic engagement as the structure supporting social justice and the good society.⁶

Whatever the source, there has emerged a widespread idea that something has been lost in American society and that a return to community is in order. The loss is expressed most frequently in terms of the decline of civic life and the deterioration of local neighborhoods.⁷ The sense of longing appears, ironically, to be greatest among baby boomers, a group that has achieved widespread socioeconomic success when considered in historical perspective. Seeking an alternative to mainstream institutions such as old-line churches, urban sprawl, and market-induced conspicuous consumption, the baby boom generation is driving unforeseen demand for the good that is deemed community.⁸

But if community has come to mean everything good, as a concept it loses its analytical bite and therefore means nothing. What exactly do we mean by community? Does the term refer to geographic locales, such as neighborhoods? Or to common membership in some association or group? Does it mean shared values and deep commitments, and if so to what? What in fact does community supply that makes it so in demand? Not only are the answers unclear, the current appropriation of community rhetoric elides any references to the dark side of communal life. One might ask, what do we stand to lose by a return to community—what does community deny? Perhaps more important, does the current drumbeat of allusions to community values bespeak a mythical past, raising the paradox of returning to nowhere?

The thesis of this chapter is that community does matter, albeit not in the simple way that current yearning suggests. Communities are an important arena for realizing common values and maintaining effective social controls. As such, they provide important public goods, or what many have termed "social capital," that bear on patterns of social organization and human well-being. There is hope in this conception, for it re-

veals ways to harness social change to reflect the nature of transformed (not lost) communities. Especially in low-income, socially disadvantaged neighborhoods, dimensions of social capital may work to buffer the forces of sociodemographic changes that have battered the idea of community. But the concept is not an unqualified good, and thus one must also come to grips with such potential adverse consequences as local corruption and the social exclusion of outsiders.

To tackle these matters, this chapter begins by reviewing some of the defining themes of community and neighborhood, placing present concerns within the framework of intellectual history. Although not apparent from recent debates, there is a long history of research and theory on urbanism and community in the United States. Community has been lost and rediscovered many times, it turns out, so one must be careful not to unwittingly reinvent old solutions or wax nostalgic for a mythical past.

I next highlight the social dimensions by which communities in the United States are stratified ecologically. Neighborhoods vary a great deal in terms of racial isolation and the concentration of socioeconomic resources, and social dislocations such as crime, public disorder, and poor health come bundled in geographical space.

I then turn to the heart of the topic: what community supplies and how structural forces in the larger society shape the internal dynamics of communities. Specifically, I explicate a theory of community social organization and the public-good aspects of social capital such as informal social control mechanisms, network ties to extralocal power, mutual trust, capacity for efficacious action, and organizational resources that communities can in theory provide. Just as important, I delineate what research has revealed about the ways structural forces (for example, inequality and stability) promote or inhibit these public goods. The final sections of the chapter look to priorities in research and policy. What are the major limitations of the research that has been done on neighborhoods? What are promising strategies for advancing new knowledge on building the capacity for community? On policy, I propose steps that the country might take to improve the collective capacity of low-income neighborhoods. In particular, I elaborate realistic policy options for intervening in ways that increase social capital supplied by community.

Before turning to this agenda, some caveats are in order. The questions addressed here are complex and have engaged earnest probing from scholars in disciplines including political science, sociology, economics, and philosophy. One cannot hope to do justice to these efforts, and thus I

5. See for example, Kunster (1996); and Handley (1996).

6. Ezioni (1996); Purnam (1993); and Selznick (1992).

7. Purnam (1996); and Ehrenhalt (1995).

8. On churches see Trueheart (1996).

remain focused by imposing the following constraints. First, my discussion pertains largely to local geographical communities or residential settlements, typically known as neighborhoods or local community areas. Second, I underscore how disadvantaged low-income neighborhoods, especially the concentrated poverty areas of our large cities, fare with respect to community social organization. Third, I touch on but do not repeat the studies on the operational definitions of neighborhoods. My discussion errs on the side of theoretical development. Fourth, I defer to others a discussion of the program evaluation of community development corporations and community initiatives.⁹ Finally, I invoke a normative or evaluative dimension necessitated by the linkage of community with social capital. If one is to specify, as I do, an exemplar of social goods provided by community, some constraints on content are necessary to avoid racism, social exclusion, and other potential abuses of majoritarian repression. My stance is thus one of grounded social theory, the interplay of community-level theory and empirical research guided by the normative compass of law and social justice.

Community: Lost, Found, and Liberated

The "loss of community" is by no means a new concern. The basis of the classic urban paradigm in sociology is related to the massive social changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Concern over the presumed decline of traditional forms of personal association in small towns and neighborhoods under the advance of urbanization and industrialization was widely expressed by early sociologists such as Frederick Tönnies, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, and Max Weber. Louis Wirth later expanded these concerns by positing that size, density, heterogeneity, and anonymity were socially disintegrative features that characterized rapidly changing cities.¹⁰ He contended that these defining elements constrained social relations to be impersonal and superficial and that this estrangement undermined family life and the intimate bonds of local community.

Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay integrated Wirth's theme of social disintegration with Robert Park and Ernest Burgess's ecological theory of

cities by focusing on neighborhood characteristics associated with high rates of delinquency.¹¹ In their major work, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*, Shaw and McKay identified poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability as consistent predictors of delinquency rates. They also discovered that high rates of delinquency in Chicago persisted in low-income, heterogeneous (usually immigrant) areas over many years, even as the mix of ethnic groups changed. These findings led them to argue that criminal behavior was intergenerationally transmitted in neighborhoods of "social disorganization."¹²

Barry Wellman summarizes this classical tradition in urban sociology under the label "Community Lost," invoking the idea that the social ties of modern urbanites have become impersonal, transitory, and segmented, hastening the eclipse of community and feeding the process of social disorganization.¹³ Community Lost is thus a salient theme that has a venerable history in twentieth-century America.¹⁴

Research, however, suggests that Wirth's thesis is naive and the pronouncement of the loss of community premature. Ethnographic research in the 1950s and 1960s discovered thriving urban communities and ethnic enclaves where kinship and friendship flourished.¹⁵ Especially in poor urban neighborhoods, the evidence of dense social networks and local identification remained strong.¹⁶ Most notably, William Whyte criticized the prevalent theory that slum communities were disorganized after discovering through extensive fieldwork the intricate social ties within the social structure of a low-income Italian area of Boston (the North End).¹⁷

Even quantitative studies began to challenge the hegemony of Community Lost. In an important 1975 survey replication in a Rochester, New York, neighborhood of a study conducted there in 1950, Albert Hunter found a decrease in the use of shopping, entertainment, and other facilities but no change in informal neighboring and local interaction. Indeed, the local sense of community had increased, leading him to conclude that "the hypothesized consequences of an ecological and functional increase in scale have not resulted in a social and cultural-symbolic loss of commu-

11. Shaw and McKay (1942); and Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (1925).

12. Kornhauser (1978).

13. Wellman (1979).

14. See also Nisbet (1953).

15. Gans (1962).

16. Jacobs (1961); and Stack (1974).

17. Whyte (1943).

9. See chapter 12; and Connell and others (1995).

10. Wirth (1938).

nity."¹⁸ Summarizing these findings, ethnographic and quantitative alike, Barry Wellman declared a mid-century era of "Community Saved."¹⁹

As suburbanization and technological change have increased in the past two decades, scholarship has begun to reach a compromise in the Community Lost and Community Saved arguments. The research of theorists on social networks has shown that, contrary to the assumptions of a decline in primary relations and to the Community Saved image of dense parochial ties, modern urbanites have created nonspatial communities—viable social relations dispersed in space.²⁰ Modern urban dwellers, for example, might not know (or want to know) their neighbors on an intimate basis, but they are likely to have interpersonal networks spread throughout the city, state, and even country. Wellman refers to this expanded concept of community as "Community Liberated," or what might be thought of as community beyond propinquity. This does not mean local relations are unimportant, but only that they are no longer controlling for many areas of social life. Such contingency of commitment to locality in the modern age has also been defined as the "community of limited liability," where attachment to neighborhood is contingent, voluntary, and based on instrumental values tied to rational investment rather than the constrained interpersonal ties that characterized the urban villages of America's past.²¹

Claude Fischer has presented a similar vision of what urbanism has wrought and what it means to think of communities as liberated.²² Clarity is accomplished by emphasizing the distinction between the public and private spheres of social life. In the urban world of strangers a person typically has the capacity to know people categorically, to place them by appearance (age, ethnicity, lifestyle) in one of many urban subcultures.²³ But as Fischer argues, this is a situational not a psychological style, and it says nothing about attitudes and action in the private sphere. City dwellers have not lost the capacity for deep, long-lasting relationships; rather they have gained the capacity for surface, fleeting relationships that are restricted. Consequently, urbanism's effects are specified: estrangement oc-

18. Hunter (1975, p. 549).

19. Wellman (1979).

20. Tilly (1973, p. 211).

21. Janowitz (1975); and Chaskin (1995).

22. Fischer (1982).

23. Lofland (1973).

curs in the public sphere—less helpfulness, more conflict—but not in the private sphere—personal relationships and psychological well-being.

It is unfortunate that the present nostalgia for community has emerged almost oblivious to a research cycle of Community Lost, Saved, and Liberated. The evidence supports the argument for Community Liberated, showing that community has been transformed rather than lost. I use this framework to understand what community supplies in mass society. The evidence is now clear that urban dwellers rely less than they have in the past on local neighborhoods for psychological support, cultural and religious nourishment, and economic needs and transactions. They can shop, work, go to church, and make friends throughout geographical space and, increasingly, cyber space. This alone suggests that interventions in the local community are unlikely to succeed to the extent that they attempt to penetrate the private world of personal relations.

Extending the idea of the community of limited liability, I contend that we do not need communities so much to satisfy our private and personal needs, which are best met elsewhere, nor even to meet our sustenance needs, which for better or worse appear to be irretrievably dispersed in space. Rather, local community remains essential as a site for the realization of common values in support of social goods, including public safety, norms of civility and mutual trust, efficacious voluntary associations, and collective socialization of the young.

The local community remains important for another reason—economic resources and social-structural differentiation in general are very much spatial in the United States. Income, education, housing stock—the bedrock of physical and human capital—are distributed unevenly across geographical space, often in conjunction with ascribed characteristics such as racial composition. The continuing and in some cases increasing significance of such ecological differentiation is fundamental to our understanding of community social capital.

Before addressing ecological differentiation, however, I must first digress to consider the operational definitions of community and neighborhood in modern society. The complexity of the phenomenon is staggering; G. A. Hillery alone reviews close to one hundred definitions of neighborhoods.²⁴ The traditional definition of a neighborhood, as used by Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and other members of the early Chicago School, refers to an ecological subsection of a larger community, a collection of

24. Hillery (1984). See also Choldin (1984).

both people and institutions occupying a spatially defined area that is conditioned by a set of ecological, cultural, and political forces.²⁵ In an almost utopian way, Park defined neighborhood as "a locality with sentiments, traditions, and a history of its own."²⁶ He also claimed that the neighborhood was the basis of social and political organization, albeit not in a formal sense.

Park's definition overstates the cultural and political distinctiveness of residential enclaves, but there are aspects of it worth preserving. Most important is the recognition first that neighborhoods are an ecological unit and second that they are nested within successively larger communities.²⁷ There is no one neighborhood, but many neighborhoods that vary in size and complexity depending on the social phenomenon of interest and the ecological structure of the larger community. This idea of embeddedness is why Harvey Choldin argues for the term *subcommunity*, emphasizing that the local neighborhood is integrally linked to, and dependent on, a larger whole.²⁸ For these reasons, one can think of residential neighborhoods as what Gerald Suttles calls a "mosaic of overlapping boundaries" or what Albert Reiss calls an "imbricated structure."²⁹

Operationally, one can think of a hierarchy of imbricated ecological units that vary in size and function. For example, within many cities *local community areas* have reasonable ecological integrity. Although fairly large, they often have well-known names and borders such as freeways, parks, and major streets. Chicago has seventy-seven local community areas averaging 40,000 persons that were designed to correspond to socially meaningful and natural geographic boundaries. Although some boundaries have changed over time, the areas are nonetheless widely recognized by administrative agencies and local institutions concerned with service delivery. *Census tracts* refer to smaller and more socially homogeneous areas of 3,000–5,000 residents. Although governmentally defined for administrative purposes, census tract boundaries are usually drawn to take into account major streets, parks, and other geographical features. A third and even smaller area approximating the lay person's concept of neighborhood is the *block group*—a group of blocks averaging 1,000 residents. The smallest units typically used in research are *street blocks* (the area in-

cluding the sides of the street facing and including one's home), similar to what Suttles calls *face blocks*.³⁰

To be sure, local community areas, census tracts, block groups, and street or face blocks constitute imperfect operational definitions for empirical research. Apropos the Community Liberated argument, social networks are also potentially boundless in physical space.³¹ Yet operationally, the geographic units typically used in studies are reasonably consonant with the idea of overlapping and nested ecological structures and generally possess more integrity with respect to geographic boundaries, land use patterns, and social homogeneity than cities or metropolitan areas. More to the point, they have been put to the test successfully in a wide range of empirical research projects.

Ecological Differentiation and Community Stratification

A wealth of research has relied on local community areas, census tracts, and block groups to study the ecological differentiation of American cities. Research traditions rooted in "social area analysis" and "factorial ecology" have established structural characteristics that vary among neighborhoods, chiefly along the dimensions of socioeconomic stratification (poverty, occupational attainment), family structure, residential stability (home ownership, tenure), race or ethnicity, and urbanization (density).

In an influential midcentury work, Ernest Shevky and Wendell Bell developed three constructs to reflect social differentiation and stratification in urban industrial society: *social rank*, *urbanization and family status*, and *segregation*.³² Using census tracts as units of analysis, they measured socioeconomic status by the configuration of census variables relating to occupation, education, and rent; urbanization and family status by variables relating to single-family versus multifamily units, fertility, and female labor force participation; and segregation by the proportions of racial and ethnic groups living in relative isolation. Typologies based on this scheme came to be known as "social area analysis," the main idea being that social stratification was manifested in geographical areas. Although

30. Suttles (1972).

31. Fischer (1982); and Wellman (1979).

32. Shevky and Bell (1955, pp. 3, 5).

25. Park (1916, pp. 147–54).

26. Park (1916, p. 95).

27. Park (1916, p. 114).

28. Choldin (1984).

29. Suttles (1972, p. 59); and Reiss (1996).

the typologies were criticized for reasons that go beyond the focus of this chapter, independent studies of American cities during this period, using other empirical approaches such as "factorial ecology," largely confirmed that social differentiation occurs along dimensions of socioeconomic status, family status, and ethnic status.³³

Despite limitations, then, research has managed to demonstrate that many social indicators coalesce in physical space. Current research is attempting to investigate how macro forces lead to the clustering of social and economic factors in urban areas. The best-known result is William Julius Wilson's theory of "concentration effects" that arise from living in a neighborhood that is overwhelmingly impoverished.³⁴ Wilson argues that the social transformation of inner-city areas in recent decades has resulted in an increased concentration of the most disadvantaged segments of the urban black population, especially poor, female-headed families with children. Whereas 70 percent of all poor non-Hispanic whites lived in nonpoverty areas in the ten largest U.S. cities in 1980, only 16 percent of poor blacks did. Moreover, whereas less than 7 percent of poor whites lived in extreme poverty areas, 38 percent of poor blacks lived there.³⁵ At the national level in 1990, fully 25 percent of poor blacks lived in concentrated poverty neighborhoods compared with only 3 percent of poor whites.³⁶ The consequences of these distributions are profound because they mean that relationships between race and individual outcomes are systematically confounded with important differences in community contexts.

The concentration of poverty and joblessness has been fueled by macroeconomic changes related to the deindustrialization of central cities where low-income minorities are disproportionately located.³⁷ These changes include a shift from goods-producing to service-producing industries, the increasing polarization of the labor market into low-wage and high-wage workers, and the relocation of manufacturing away from the inner cities. The related exodus of middle- and upper-income black families from the inner city has also, according to Wilson, removed an important social buffer that could potentially deflect the full impact of pro-

longed joblessness and industrial transformation.³⁸ The social milieu of increasing stratification among blacks differs significantly from the environment that existed in inner-city neighborhoods a few decades ago. Wilson argues that income mixing within communities was more characteristic of ghetto neighborhoods in the 1940s and 1950s and that inequality among communities today has become more pronounced as a result of the increasing spatial separation of middle- and upper-income blacks from lower-income blacks.³⁹

Focusing on racial segregation, Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton describe how, in a segregated environment, economic shocks that push more people into the ranks of low-income earners not only bring about an increase in the poverty rate for the group as a whole but also cause an increase in the geographic concentration of poverty.⁴⁰ This geographic intensification occurs because the additional poverty created by macroeconomic conditions is spread unevenly over a metropolitan area.⁴¹ The greater the segregation, "the smaller the number of neighborhoods absorbing the shock, and the more severe the resulting concentration of poverty."⁴² At the other end of the income distribution, the growing geographic concentration of (predominantly white) affluence suggests a society increasingly bifurcated by wealth.⁴³ Although for different reasons, both Wilson and Massey contend that race-linked social change is a structural force that is reflected in local environments.

Indicators of economic disadvantage and racial composition are not only highly concentrated ecologically, they are clustered with social dislocations that are themselves increasingly concentrated. In a case study of Cleveland, for example, Julian Chow and Claudia Coulton sought to determine whether there was a social transformation of urban neighborhoods in the 1980s.⁴⁴ Rather than simply documenting the spread of social problems and the growth of a so-called underclass, they applied Wilson's theory of social transformation by searching for evidence of structural change in the ecological distribution and interrelationship of vi-

38. Wilson (1987, p. 56).

39. Wilson (1996); see also Jargowsky (1997).

40. Massey and Denton (1993).

41. See also Sampson and Morenoff (1997).

42. Massey (1990, p. 337).

43. Massey (1996).

44. Chow and Coulton (1992).

33. Berry and Kasarda (1977). For criticisms see, for instance, Gordon (1967).

34. Wilson (1987).

35. Wilson and others (1988, pp. 130).

36. See Jargowsky (1997, p. 41).

37. Wilson (1996).

olent crime, drug addiction, teenage pregnancy, and welfare dependency.⁴⁵ Comparing ecological structures for various social indicators in 1980 and 1989, they showed that 1980 was characterized by an evenly distributed three-factor structure defined by unruliness (weakened social control of adolescents), family disruption (family composition and maternal and child health), and dangerousness (crime and drug arrests). By 1989, however, these social conditions had become more interrelated, and one factor, which they call impoverishment, emerged as the dominant underlying construct. Much other research has shown that crime, public disorder, dropping out of school, child maltreatment, and other social dislocations often come bundled together in areas of concentrated poverty.⁴⁶

Recognition of the spatial clustering of social problems actually has a long history. In the 1920s Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay discovered that the same Chicago neighborhoods characterized by poverty, residential instability, and high rates of crime and delinquency were also plagued by high rates of infant mortality, low birthweight, tuberculosis, physical abuse, and other factors detrimental to child development. They thus argued that delinquency "is not an isolated phenomenon" and went on to document the close association of delinquency rates with a host of social problems that directly influence children.⁴⁷ This general empirical finding has emerged repeatedly. As but one example, Roderick and Deborah Wallace have presented evidence that rates of violent death across communities in New York City covary with rates of low birthweight and infant mortality.⁴⁸ Clearly, there is a connection between the healthy development of children and community structure.

In short, research on ecological differentiation has established some facts. First, there is considerable race-linked economic inequality among neighborhoods and communities, evidenced by the clustering of indicators of both advantaged and disadvantaged socioeconomic status and racial isolation. Second, social problems come bundled at the neighborhood level, including but not limited to crime, social disorder, public incivilities, and poor child health. Third, empirical results do not seem to vary much with the operational unit of analysis. The ecological stratification of local communities in American society by social class, poverty, race, family sta-

45. Wilson (1987).

46. See also Coulton and others (1995).

47. Shaw and McKay (1969, p. 106).

48. Wallace and Wallace (1990).

tus, and crime emerges at multiple levels of geographical structure, whether measured by local community areas, census tracts, or other neighborhood units. Fourth, the ecological concentration of poverty, racial isolation, and social dislocations appears to have increased significantly along with the concentration of affluence, especially during the 1980s and 1990s.⁴⁹

Despite increased urbanization and a complex imbricated structure, neighborhoods and residential subcommunities remain persistent in American society. As any real estate agent or homeowner will attest, location does matter. It remains for a theory of community to specify the social mechanisms by which structural dimensions of community, especially the concentration of urban poverty, racial segregation, and residential stability, matter. It is to this issue I now turn.

Theory of Community Social Organization

At the most general level, community social organization may be thought of as the ability of a community structure to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls.⁵⁰ Social control should not be equated with repression or forced conformity. Rather, it refers to the capacity of a social unit to regulate itself according to desired principles, to realize collective, as opposed to forced, goals.⁵¹ This conception is similar to Charles Tilly's definition of collective action: the application of a community's pooled resources to common ends.⁵² One of the most central of such common goals, of course, is the desire of community residents to live in safe and orderly environments free of predatory crime. There also seems to be a consensus among Americans on the virtues of neighborhoods characterized by economic sufficiency, good schools, adequate housing, and a clean, healthy environment. The capacity to achieve such common goals is linked to informal relationships established for other purposes and more formal efforts to achieve social regulation through institutional means.⁵³

49. On the increase in social dislocations see Jargowsky (1997); on the concentration of affluence see Massey (1996).

50. Kornhauser (1978); Bursik (1988); and Sampson and Groves (1989).

51. Janowitz (1975, pp. 82, 87).

52. Tilly (1973).

53. Kornhauser (1978, p. 24).

The present framework of social control does not rest on homogeneity, whether cultural or sociodemographic. Diverse populations can and do agree on wanting safe streets. And social conflicts can and do rend communities along the lines of economic resources, race, political empowerment, and the role of criminal justice agents in defining and controlling drug use, gangs, panhandling, and police misconduct. Conflict usually coalesces around the distribution of resources and power, not the content of core values.⁵⁴ As Philip Selznick has written, "communities are characterized by structural differentiation as well as by shared consciousness." The goal of community is thus unity in diversity, or the reconciliation of partial and general perspectives on the common good.⁵⁵

This sociological conception of social control addresses the longstanding criticism that theories of community social organization deemphasize social conflict.⁵⁶ Recognizing that collective efforts to achieve common goals are variable and coexist with conflict, I thus favor "differential social organization" over the misleading term "social disorganization" common in many studies.⁵⁷ In other words, I accept that communities lack homogeneity as I define them and focus on the variable forms of organization, formal and informal. Furthermore, my definition embraces geography rather than solidarity or identity as the major criterion identifying a community. Following Tilly, that is, I "choose to make territoriality define communities and to leave the extent of solidarity problematic."⁵⁸ When formulated in this way, the dimensions of community social organization are analytically separable not only from racial segregation, concentrated poverty, instability, and other exogenous sources of variation but from the social goods that may result.

Networks, Social Capital, and Collective Efficacy

The social-control way of thinking about community is grounded in what John Kasarda and Morris Janowitz call the "systemic" model, in which the local community is viewed as a complex system of friendship and kinship networks, and of formal and informal associational ties rooted in

54. Kornhauser (1978).

55. Selznick (1992, pp. 367, 369).

56. Kornhauser (1978).

57. Sampson and Groves (1989).

58. Tilly (1973, p. 212).

family life, on-going socialization processes, and local institutions.⁵⁹ Important systemic dimensions of community social organization are the prevalence, interdependence, and overlapping nature of social networks (for example, the density of acquaintanceship and intergenerational ties), local participation in formal and voluntary organizations, and the span of collective attention that the community directs toward local problems.

Thus conceived, the systemic model of social capital borrows insights gleaned from the social network paradigm in sociology. As a theoretical project, network analysis rejects the attempt to explain social process in terms of individual cognition or categorical attributes such as poverty or ethnicity. What counts more are the *social relations among persons* and the *structural connections among positions*. Applied to the local community, network analysis investigates the constraining and enabling dimensions of patterned relationships among social actors in an ecological system. The important point to take from this view is that community composition, the aggregation of individual characteristics, matters primarily as it bears on network structure.

The systemic or network analysis of social control is theoretically compatible with more recent formulations of what has been termed *social capital*. James Coleman defines social capital by its functions: it is created when the structure of relations among persons facilitates action, "making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible."⁶⁰ By contrast, physical capital is embodied in observable material form, and human capital is embodied in the skills and knowledge acquired by an individual. Social capital is even less tangible, for it is a social good embodied in the relations among persons and positions.⁶¹ In other words, social capital is lodged not in individuals but in the structure of social organization. Robert Putnam has defined social capital in a similar fashion as "features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit."⁶² Unlike physical capital, social capital is a resource that becomes depleted if not used regularly.

It follows that communities high in social capital are better able to realize common values and maintain effective social controls. Consider the

59. Kasarda and Janowitz (1974, p. 329). See also Bott (1957); and Sampson (1988).

60. Coleman (1988, p. 98).

61. Coleman (1990, p. 304).

62. Putnam (1993, p. 36).

case of childrearing, which is analyzed typically from the perspective of families. Neighborhoods characterized by extensive obligations, expectations, and interlocking social networks connecting adults are best able to facilitate the informal social control of children.⁶³ When parents know the parents of their children's friends, for example, they have the potential to observe the child's actions in different circumstances, talk to each other about the child, compare notes, and establish norms.⁶⁴ Such close local networks provide the child with social capital of a collective nature, as reflected in the idea that "it takes a whole village to raise a child." One can extend this model to networks involving parents and teachers, religious and recreational leaders, businesses that serve youth, and agents of criminal justice.⁶⁵

Recent theory suggests, however, that social networks alone are not sufficient to understand local communities. After all, networks are differentially invoked; and in fact dense, tight-knit networks may actually impede social organization if they are isolated or weakly linked to collective expectations for action.

In a related manner the term *social capital* is perhaps misleading in that it alludes to a commodity or thing rather than a process. Theorizing that informal social control is a general phenomenon differentially activated across neighborhoods, Robert Sampson and colleagues proposed an analogy between individual efficacy and neighborhood efficacy: both are processes that seek to achieve an intended effect.⁶⁶ At the neighborhood level the willingness of residents to intervene for the common good depends in large part on conditions of mutual trust and cohesion among neighbors. One is unlikely to intervene in a neighborhood where the rules are unclear and people mistrust or fear one another.

Private ties notwithstanding, then, it is the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the common good that defines the neighborhood context of what Sampson and colleagues term *collective efficacy*.⁶⁷ Just as individuals vary in their capacity for effective action, so too do neighborhoods vary in their capacity to achieve common goals. And just as individual self-efficacy is situated rather than global (one has self-efficacy relative to a particular task or type of task), in this view

63. Sampson (1992).

64. Coleman (1988).

65. Sampson (1992).

66. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997).

67. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997).

neighborhood efficacy exists relative to the tasks of supervising children and maintaining public order. It follows that the collective efficacy of residents is a critical feature of urban neighborhoods, regardless of the demographic composition of the population.

Institutions and Public Control

The present integration of a social capital and systemic network model of community social organization should not be read as ignoring institutions or the political environment of which local communities are a part. The institutional component of the systemic model is the neighborhood organizations and their linkages with other organizations, within and outside the community. Neighborhood organizations are the structural embodiment of community solidarity, and thus the instability and isolation of local institutions are key factors underlying the structural dimension of social organization. For example, Ruth Kornhauser argues that when the horizontal links among institutions in a community are weak, the capacity to defend local interests is weakened.⁶⁸ Moreover, institutional strength is not necessarily isomorphic with neighborhood cohesion. Many communities exhibit intense private ties among friends and kin yet still lack the institutional capacity to achieve social control.⁶⁹

Vertical integration is potentially even more important. Robert Bursik and Harold Grasmick emphasize the importance of *public control*, defined as the capacity of local community organizations to obtain police and fire services, block grants and other extralocal resources that help sustain neighborhood social stability and local control.⁷⁰ Hunter contends that parochial social control—social order within the community based on interpersonal networks and interlocking local institutions—"leaves unresolved the problems of public order in a civil society."⁷¹ The problem is that public order is provided mainly by institutions of the state, and observance of public (citizenship) obligations has declined while observance of civil (individual) rights has become more intense. This imbalance of collective obligations and individual rights undermines the effectiveness of public-private alliances as a way to maintain order. According to

68. Kornhauser (1978, p. 79).

69. Hunter (1985).

70. Bursik and Grasmick (1993).

71. Hunter (1985, p. 216).

Hunter, communities must work together with the forces of public control to achieve social order, principally through an interdependence among informal social controls and formal institutions such as the police.

Linking Structural Differentiation and Social Organization

The preceding discussion underscores the reality that community social capital does not emerge from a vacuum. It is embedded in structural contexts and a political economy of place. Structural differentiation and extralocal political economy shape the dimensions of neighborhood social organization.

Research shows that local friendship ties and the density of acquaintanceship vary widely across communities and that these variations are positively related to residential stability in a community. Stability is typically measured by average length of residence and the prevalence of homeownership. Community stability strengthens local network ties at either end of the urban-rural continuum and is independently associated with collective attachment to community and rates of participation in social and leisure activities.⁷² Even for the individual, length of residence is related to more local friendships, attachment to the community, and participation in local social activities. Furthermore, community residential stability has significant contextual effects on an individual's local friendships and participation in local social activities even after accounting for factors such as age, social class, and life cycle.⁷³ Consistent with the predictions of the systemic model, these findings suggest that residential stability promotes a variety of social networks and local associations, thereby increasing the social capital of local communities.

Recent research shows that neighborhood variations in informal social control and institutional vitality are also systematically linked to patterns of resource deprivation and racial segregation, especially the concentration of poverty, joblessness, and family disruption. William Julius Wilson has described the corroding effects on neighborhood social organization of concentrated joblessness and the social isolation of the urban poor.⁷⁴ He argues that in areas of economic distress where men are marginalized

from the labor market and often family life as well, the incentives for participation in the social aspects of community life are reduced. He also contends that the percentage of employed adults who mentor and guide youth through troubled circumstances in low-income communities has decreased along with the employment and manufacturing base of inner-city areas.⁷⁵ Sampson and Wilson argue similarly that the loss of both stable employment and middle-class families in distressed urban areas has undermined the collective socialization of youth as reflected in neighborhood monitoring, institutional resources, and adult role models.⁷⁶

The importance of economic stratification by place is revealed in a series of recent studies. Jeanne Brooks-Gunn and colleagues reported that for many child and adolescent outcomes such as low IQ, dropping out of high school, problem behaviors, and out-of-wedlock births the *absence* of affluent neighbors was more important than the *presence* of low-income neighbors. In particular, high economic status proved to be more important than the poverty status, racial composition, or the family structure of neighborhoods.⁷⁷ The authors speculate that this finding supports theories of "collective socialization," where neighborhood adult role models and monitoring are seen as essential to a child's socialization, rather than theories of "contagion," wherein the power of peer influences is thought to spread problem behavior. Lawrence Aber found that neighborhood socioeconomic status and joblessness interacted to predict adolescent outcomes: it was in conditions of high jobless rates that the absence of affluent neighbors served to depress academic achievement scores.⁷⁸

A number of studies have begun to explore the mechanisms of community social organization more directly, especially how they are shaped by ecological differentiation. Robert Sampson and W. Byron Groves analyzed more than 200 communities in Great Britain and reported that the social control of street corner peer groups, local friendship and acquaintanceship ties, and participation in organizations were each significantly related to lower crime rates.⁷⁹ Variations in these structural dimensions of

75. See also Anderson (1990).

76. Sampson and Wilson (1995).

77. Brooks-Gunn and others (1993, p. 383). This study, like nearly all attempting to measure neighborhood effects, is subject to the criticism that the correlations that are found are due to the unobserved characteristics of the residents rather than to the social structure. See the discussion of this issue below.

78. Aber (1992).

79. Sampson and Groves (1989).

72. Sampson (1988, 1991).

73. Sampson (1988).

74. Wilson (1996).

community social organization were also shown to account for a large part of the association of community socioeconomic status, residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, and family disruption with crime. More specifically, residential stability was directly associated with local friendship networks and the density of acquaintanceship, family disruption was the largest predictor of unsupervised peer groups, and socioeconomic status was linked to increased levels of organizational participation.

More recently, Delbert Elliott and colleagues examined survey data collected in 1990 from neighborhoods in Chicago and Denver. A multi-level analysis revealed that a measure of informal control was significantly related to adolescent outcomes in both places—positively to school achievement and conventional friendships, for instance, and negatively to delinquency.⁸⁰ Their neighborhood social-control scale represented a combination of measures tapping mutual respect for local authority, whether neighbors would intervene to stem social deviance, and satisfaction with the neighborhood. Informal control also explained the effects of neighborhood structural disadvantage: unstable poor neighborhoods with a high proportion of single-parent families were less able to maintain informal social control and suffered higher rates of adolescent problem behavior and lower rates of adolescent competence.

A similar finding was reported in Sampson's analysis of a community survey in Chicago designed to measure the willingness of neighbors to intervene in skipping school, spray-painting graffiti, and like public acts of deviance by children.⁸¹ Variations in the informal social control of children across eighty neighborhoods were positively related to residential stability and negatively related to concentrated poverty. In fact, informal social control accounted for more than half of the relationship between residential stability and lower rates of delinquency. Even after adjusting for previous levels of crime in the neighborhood, informal social control emerged as a significant inhibitor of adolescent misbehavior. Further empirical analysis of Chicago neighborhoods supported this general theoretical orientation with respect to collective efficacy and rates of violence.⁸²

Although limited, the cumulative results of recent research support the idea that neighborhoods characterized by mistrust, sparse acquaintance-ship networks among residents, attenuated social control of public

spaces, and a weak institutional base coupled with little participation in local voluntary associations face an increased risk of crime, social disorder, and troublesome youth behavior. Perhaps more important, these dimensions of community social capital or collective efficacy are systematically structured (although not determined) by differences in wealth, jobs, family status, and residential tenure. Once again, however, one must be careful not to view structural patterns as arising solely from processes indigenous to neighborhoods. To understand neighborhood variations—and ultimately to design community interventions—one must also take into account urban political economy.

Political Economy

Emphasizing the political economy of urban communities repudiates the biotic model and pure market assumptions of classical ecology, reflected most famously in the notion of a "natural area." It is hard to overemphasize the seminal influence of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess of the Chicago School, who conceived of neighborhoods as dynamic, adaptive systems driven by free market competition among businesses for land use and (primarily) among population groups for affordable and desirable housing.⁸³ Borrowing concepts from Darwinian theory, Park focused on the "balance of nature" and argued that natural forces were responsible for the initial distribution, concentration, and segregation of urban populations. Social organization derived after the fact from proximity and neighborly contact as well as the homogeneity of spatially contiguous populations.⁸⁴ According to this view, city neighborhoods are in effect natural areas that provide the site for a developing normative order.

Empirical research on the political economy of American cities has largely invalidated this concept, showing that structural differentiation is shaped directly and indirectly by the spatial decisions of public officials and businesses. The decline and destabilization of many central-city neighborhoods, for instance, has been facilitated not only by individual preferences as manifested in voluntary migration patterns, but government decisions on public housing, incentives for suburban growth in the form of tax breaks for developers and private mortgage assistance, high-

80. Elliott and others (1996).

81. Sampson (1997).

82. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997).

83. Park (1916); and Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (1925). See also Sampson and Morenoff (1997).

84. See Orleans (1969, pp. 98).

way construction and urban renewal, economic disinvestment in central cities, and zoning restrictions on land use.

Consider public housing and the legacy of urban renewal. Robert Bursik has shown that the construction of new public housing projects in Chicago in the 1970s was associated with increased rates of population turnover, which predicted increases in crime independent of the area's population composition.⁸⁵ Wesley Skogan has noted that urban renewal and forced migration contributed to the wholesale uprooting of many urban communities, and especially that freeway networks driven through the center of many cities in the 1960s destroyed viable, low-income neighborhoods.⁸⁶ Across the nation, fully 20 percent of all central-city housing units occupied by blacks were lost in the 1960s because of urban redevelopment. This displacement does not even include that brought about by evictions, rent increases, and other routine market forces.⁸⁷

Equally disturbing, Wilson documents the often disastrous consequences of municipal decisions to concentrate minorities and the poor in public housing.⁸⁸ Opposition from organized community groups to building public housing in their neighborhoods, *de facto* federal policy to tolerate extensive segregation against blacks in urban housing markets, and the decision by local governments to neglect code enforcement and the rehabilitation of existing residential units have all contributed to segregated housing projects that have become ghettos for many poor minority members.⁸⁹ Massey and Denton argue further that public housing represents a federally funded, physically permanent institution for the isolation of black families by race and class and must therefore be considered an important structural constraint on ecological area of residence.⁹⁰

The responsibilities of private development and business do not emerge unscathed, either. The idea of cities as growth machines reflects the marriage of private markets and enthusiastic (read tax-dependent) governments to pursue aggressive development, often at the expense of previously stable communities with strong patterns of local social organization.⁹¹ Tax breaks for suburban development and federally supported

85. Bursik (1989).

86. Skogan (1986, 1990).

87. Logan and Molotch (1987, p. 114).

88. Wilson (1987, pp. 20-62).

89. See Hirsch (1983).

90. Massey and Denton (1993).

91. Logan and Molotch (1987).

housing mortgages have been especially prominent in the hollowing out of many urban centers. Historically, real estate agents have aided racial segregation and neighborhood instability by acting as panic peddlers in an effort to induce or accelerate the pace of neighborhood change.⁹² Joining them have been banks that realigned mortgage applications and promoted economic disinvestment in the inner city.

Zoning, a seemingly innocuous administrative practice, has undermined the social aspects of traditional urban life. By design, zoning is intended to create separate geographical spaces, and it has done so by cutting up neighborhoods into artificial segments, which disrupts patterns of social interaction and human activities. Strip malls, restrictions on mixed-income housing, the separation of stores from residences, minimum lot sizes, gated enclaves, and the banishment of sidewalks have combined to create what James Kunstler has termed "dead spaces."⁹³ Indeed, the eerie lack of people walking and interacting on the streets of many suburban developments attests to zoning's dehumanization of the environment.

Whether it be through the purposeful segregation of low-income public housing, highway construction, urban renewal, government subsidized development by the private sector, zoning, redlining, blockbusting, or something so simple yet powerfully symbolic as gated communities with no sidewalks, it is no longer possible to think of neighborhoods as natural areas created by the aggregation of individual preferences alone. Clearly, government, business, and the political economy matter to an understanding of what communities can and cannot supply.

Public Disorder and Neighborhood Social Capital

Robert Putnam has traced the precipitous deterioration in critical forms of social capital and civic life over the course of recent American history.⁹⁴ He examines a long list of potential culprits, including television, female labor force participation, poverty, suburbanization, time pressure, and family disruption. But there is one he missed, and one with which we must

92. Hirsch (1983).

93. Kunstler (1996).

94. Putnam (1996).

come to grips to complete our understanding of how communities come to be differentially supplied with social capital.

About 1965, which Putnam marks as the beginning of the descent, crime rates in American cities soared to unprecedented heights and have fluctuated at high levels ever since. I would argue that, above all else, crime and its legacy of fear and distrust have had important reciprocal effects on community structure and ultimately social capital. Reactions that stem from crime and disorder include

- physical and psychological withdrawal from community life,
- weakening of the informal social controls that inhibit crime,
- declining organizational life and mobilization capacity of the neighborhood,
- deteriorating business conditions,
- importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance, and

—further dramatic changes in the composition of the population.⁹⁵ For example, if people shun their neighbors and local facilities out of fear of crime, fewer opportunities exist for local networks and organizations to take hold. Inner-city street crime may also be accompanied by residential out-migration and business relocation. Crime itself can thus lead to demographic collapse and a weakening of the informal control structures and mobilization capacity of communities, which in turn fuel further crime.

Although the number of studies is small, evidence suggests that crime does undermine the social and economic fabric of urban areas. One of the most important findings is that it generates fear of strangers and alienation from participation in community life.⁹⁶ High crime rates and concerns about safety also trigger population out-migration. Bursik found that delinquency rates are not only one of the outcomes of urban change, they are an important part of the process of urban change. Studying Chicago neighborhoods, he found that "although changes in racial composition cause increases in the delinquency rate, this effect is not nearly as great as the effect that increases in the delinquency rate have in minority groups being stranded in the community."⁹⁷ A study of forty neighborhoods in eight cities found that high rates of crime and disorder were asso-

ciated with higher rates of fear, neighborhood dissatisfaction, and intentions to move out.⁹⁸ The effect of crime on population loss is observed at both the city and neighborhood levels.⁹⁹

Evidence that crime rates cause businesses to relocate is extremely scarce, but when a study of sixty-two manufacturing firms that moved from New York City to New Jersey asked for reasons why they moved, many cited safety concerns and one in ten claimed crime was the single most important reason for moving. The report concluded that security, quality of life issues, and image problems all contributed to place many outer New York City locations at a competitive disadvantage when compared with organizations in New Jersey.¹⁰⁰ Business decisions may be less sensitive to crime rates than residential ones, but they are not immune from the fear and social incivilities associated with street crime.

Although the empirical base is limited, the picture painted by research on the effects of crime is thus one of population abandonment, business relocation to the suburbs, loss of revenue, a decrease in economic status and property values, and escalating levels of fear in poor, inner-city areas. Many cities, especially in the North and Midwest, have not only lost population but have become increasingly poor and racially isolated in recent decades.¹⁰¹ An important part of this racially selective decline in population and economic status stems from increases in violent crime.¹⁰² Social disorder also provides direct, behavioral evidence of community disorganization and reinforces stereotypes of urban inhabitability.¹⁰³ By undermining social and economic organization, crime and disorder generate a reciprocal effect that leads to even further increases in social disorder. Social capital, in other words, is reciprocally related to, and thus simultaneously undermined by, public disorder and violent crime.

Directions for Community Development Research

Having outlined the sources, consequences, and multiple dimensions of community social organization, I turn now to implications for research.

98. Skogan (1990).

99. Sampson and Wooldredge (1986); and Sampson and Morenoff (1997).

100. INTERFACE (1985, p. iv).

101. Wilson (1987).

102. Morenoff and Sampson (1997).

103. Skogan (1990, p. 21).

95. Skogan (1986).

96. Skogan (1986, 1990); and Rosenbaum (1986).

97. Bursik (1986, p. 73).

Like any complex phenomenon, there is still much that needs to be known about community development and the differential supply of social capital.

One important barrier to empirical knowledge is that most research has inferred the existence of community social processes rather than measuring them directly. As Christopher Jencks and Susan Mayer observe, if neighborhood effects on social outcomes exist, presumably they work through one or more of the following social processes: contagion, socialization, institutional processes, or social comparison.¹⁰⁴ Few research efforts have directly assessed the transmission processes through which neighborhood effects operate.¹⁰⁵ Community social capital, in particular, is a construct that is much talked about but little studied in a rigorous manner.

This lacuna arises in large part from the limitations of census data, which measure population composition (poverty, race, family status), and police, welfare, health, and other agency statistics, which measure official reports. Because governments gather very little information on the collective properties of administrative units for which they routinely report information, little causal information is available for those units.¹⁰⁶ Previous neighborhood-level research has thus relied primarily on official data sources that rarely provide direct measures of key variables, especially those hypothesized to explain the relationship between community structure and social outcomes. As a consequence, monitoring, personal networks, ties, contagion, socialization, institutional connections, and other processes through which neighborhood effects might operate are largely unknown.

The lack of measurement of social-organizational processes, networks, and interactional fields is also linked to how communities are defined and conceptualized. Essentially, research has been dominated by analyses of statistical neighborhoods defined by administrative concerns (for example, census tracts) that may or may not correspond to social patterns of interaction and social cohesion. Social definitions of neighborhoods are crucial because they derive from interaction patterns, which ultimately are the primary mechanisms through which neighborhood effects are transmitted.¹⁰⁷ It is therefore doubly problematic that most efforts to establish the existence of neighborhood influences are based on the

104. Jencks and Mayer (1990).

105. See also Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994.

106. Reiss (1986).

107. Tienda (1991).

compositional characteristics of places to the neglect of social interaction and social networks within spatial domains.

A second major problem with neighborhood-level studies is that they are potentially contaminated by *selection effects*. Simply put, individuals and families are not randomly assigned to neighborhoods. Although structural constraints surely operate, so do individual choice and the differential selection of environments. Thus neighborhood differences in social capital or other aspects of social organization may result from the characteristics of individuals and families selectively located in communities rather than collective factors *per se*. For example, is the relationship between concentrated poverty and neighborhood social control caused by a simple aggregation of the effects of poverty on individuals, a genuine community-level effect, or is it simply a differential selection of families into communities based on common third factors? Questions such as these suggest that assessing neighborhood effects poses a difficult analytical challenge. Marta Tienda has argued that if systematic selection processes are the primary mechanism bringing together individuals with similar socioeconomic characteristics and behavioral dispositions in spatially bounded areas, the processes will be confused with neighborhood effects.¹⁰⁸ According to this critique, contextual or neighborhood effects may reflect nothing more than individual-level effects in disguise.¹⁰⁹ Caution must thus be the byword in any judgment about the existence of neighborhood effects.¹¹⁰

To counteract these formidable limitations requires a new generation of multidimensional, multilevel longitudinal research strategies. An examination of the dimensions of social capital first requires theoretically driven, original data collection within each of a meaningful number of neighborhoods. Fortunately, a recent movement to design survey instruments that directly measure social organizational and interactional processes is making substantial progress. Included in this movement are efforts by the MacArthur Foundation's Network on Successful Adolescence, CDC survey-based evaluations in several cities, and a series of studies of youth in disadvantaged neighborhoods sponsored by the Social Science Research Council.¹¹¹ Together these efforts are examining such

108. Tienda (1991, p. 258).

109. Cook (1998).

110. Jencks and Mayer (1990).

111. For the MacArthur Foundations Network see Cook (1998); Cook, Shagle, and Degimencioglu (1997); and Elliott and others (1996). For CDC evaluations see Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan (1996); and Sullivan (1993). For SSRC-sponsored studies see Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, and Aber (1997).

family and community dimensions of social capital as informal social control, friendship networks, and participation in community organizations in areas of economic disadvantage.

Even more oriented to the study of community processes is the Community Design program of the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods. The PHDCN is a large project that aims to increase understanding of how community and individual factors interact in the development of both prosocial and antisocial behavior.¹¹² It includes a survey of more than 8,500 residents in 343 neighborhoods, a key-informant study of some 3,000 positional and reputational leaders in 80 neighborhoods, and systematic videotaped observations of some 25,000 city blocks in Chicago. The community survey was designed specifically to measure dimensions of neighborhood social organization, especially informal social control and mutual trust.¹¹³ The informant study seeks to document empirically the varied social networks and organizational ties that connect six institutional domains: criminal justice, education, business, politics, religion, and neighborhood organizations. Relying on systematic social observation, videotaping procedure is used as a novel strategy to record the physical environment and everyday social activities that take place. Overall, a major goal of the PHDCN is to unravel the nexus of informal and formal social control that undergirds collective community action.

Surveys and even systematic social observation cannot do it all, however. An important complement to these quantitative approaches to community measurement is ethnography, particularly comparative ethnography. Traditionally, ethnographers have focused on single communities, limiting comparisons between communities and the scope of theoretical inference. It is thus encouraging that a new generation of qualitative research is beginning to focus directly on interactions within communities that vary in social organization in significant ways. For example, Mercer Sullivan's ethnography of work and crime in three Brooklyn neighborhoods, along with his current effort to study schools and community violence using a comparative ethnographic strategy, will be important guidesposts for community development studies.¹¹⁴

112. Earls (1996).

113. See for example, Sampson and Morenoff (1997).

114. Sullivan (1989, 1996).

Whether survey, observational, or ethnographic, research designs are needed that allow the study of both neighborhood and individual change as a means to distinguish contextual from individual-level effects. In particular, identifying the mechanisms producing alternative trajectories of neighborhood change is essential to avoid confounding differential selection with neighborhood effects in the study of ecologically concentrated phenomena like poverty, crime, and social disorder. Even controlling for background characteristics does not by itself deal with dynamic selection processes. As Tienda argues, multilevel models that simply combine person and place characteristics do not take into account the potential dependence of neighborhood characteristics on individual actions.¹¹⁵ Neighborhoods are dynamic entities that are constantly changing, even if they reproduce themselves socially over time. For example, a stable middle-class neighborhood remains so because the new entrants replacing out-migrants have a similar socioeconomic profile. Longitudinal designs that follow not only changes in the structure, composition, and organization of communities but also the individuals who reside there are thus needed to establish the unique contribution of individuals and communities.¹¹⁶

Furthermore, longitudinal inquiry bears on causal inferences regarding the reciprocal relationship between community and crime. As I noted, there are good reasons to expect that crime has feedback effects on many dimensions of community structure. Communities exhibit cycles or reverbers of crime, and many hypotheses on the link between the two are formulated in terms of change (for example, an increasing concentration of the underclass or disruption of social networks from residential turnover).¹¹⁷ To disentangle community-level social processes and the potential reciprocal effects of crime, longitudinal designs are needed where sequential order can be established and change explicitly modeled.

Toward Theoretically Grounded Policy

The theoretical framework explicated here also has implications for the direction of community development policy. This is not the place for an

115. Tienda (1991).

116. Reiss (1986, p. 29).

117. Reiss (1986).

evaluation of past community interventions, a discussion of the unique challenges of evaluating community policy, or a compendium of specific new initiatives.¹¹⁸ I sketch instead the contours of what effective policies for increasing the capacity of communities to supply social capital might look like. My goal is to provide a road map for community development policy that heeds the lessons of research while following the theoretical logic of community social organization in modern society.

The most important lesson from the present theory of community social capital is that policy must seek to join the forces of informal social control, local institutions, and extralocal (public) control while at the same time ameliorating the constraints imposed by economic inequality, racial segregation, concentrated poverty, and residential instability. It is now clear, for example, that community interventions are notably hard to carry out and have achieved only limited success in the areas that need them the most—poor unstable neighborhoods with high crime rates.¹¹⁹ One-shot or short-run interventions such as neighborhood watch that try to change isolated behaviors specific to a community without confronting structural aspects of the neighborhood are also, not surprisingly, highly susceptible to failure.

Moreover, community-level interventions to increase neighborhood self-help and local voluntarism have succumbed to the lack of organizations they seek to supplant. The paradox is that self-help strategies for communities give priority to the very activities made impossible or difficult by the social isolation of residents in unstable and economically vulnerable neighborhoods.¹²⁰ As political economists point out, neglecting the connections (or lack thereof) that residents have to extracommunal resources and sources of power veils the structural backdrop to community social organization.

Even if the structural context within which local communities are embedded is accounted for, neighborhood interventions will fail unless they make the appropriate changes. Recall the distinction made at the outset between the private and public worlds of city life in modern society. No longer do we depend on neighborhoods to provide psychological support, religious nourishment, and deep friendships. We do, however, expect or commonly desire many things appropriately characterized as public

goods—social order, norms of civility and trust, safety—again, the stuff of social capital. Seeking to penetrate the private world of personal relations and recreate a mythical past where everybody knew their neighbors intimately is thus a recipe for intervention failure. Indeed, community interventions seem to fall hardest when their major effort is to change individual behaviors by promoting friendships among neighbors.¹²¹

To focus solely on resurrecting local friendships also reflects a nostalgia for a village life that is long gone from cities.¹²² For better or worse, many neighborhoods are characterized by what M. P. Baumgartner calls "moral minimalism," where neighbors are acquaintances or strangers rather than friends.¹²³ Where local friendship ties are strong, they result not from government intervention but from processes induced over time by structural factors such as residential stability and the density of families with children.¹²⁴

Returning to the idea of the community of limited liability, I contend that community development policy should focus less on the private or personal realm and more on realizing public goods and shoring up a community's structural base. We should, in other words, intervene where communities need it the most—the provision of social capital, socioeconomic resources, and stability. This requires community self-help, to be sure, but self-help must be balanced by investment from the outside, strong linkages to outside sources of support, and policies that are sensitive to the potentially disruptive forces of neighborhood instability induced by unchecked development. The following is a brief sketch of steps that together begin to meet the goals specified by the theory of social capital.

Community Policing and Reduction of Social Disorder

Establishing social order and reducing crime is the first and most important order of business. Predatory crime, broken windows, trash uncollected, public drinking, and prostitution increase fear of crime and promote a downward spiral of decay and population depletion.¹²⁵ Potential offenders may feed on social disorder because they assume that residents

121. Skogan (1990).

122. Skogan (1990, p. 156).

123. Baumgartner (1988).

124. Sampson (1988).

125. Wilson and Kelling (1982); Skogan (1990); and Morenoff and Sampson (1997).

118. See Connell and others (1995); and Rossi (1998).

119. For example, Skogan (1990).

120. Hope (1995, pp. 24, 51).

are so indifferent to what goes on in their neighborhood that they will not be motivated to confront strangers, intervene in a crime, or call the police.¹²⁶ Moreover, it is difficult if not impossible to sustain successful community organization in a context of fear, mistrust, and social disorder. Reclaiming safe and orderly streets is therefore a basic need on which other interventions depend.

As one step in fostering a climate of safety, public order, and eventually social organization, community development policy should consider collective strategies to

- clean up litter, vandalized cars, broken windows, and drug needles;
- remove or rehabilitate abandoned housing;
- stagger bar closing times to control unruly crowds;
- picket or protest public drinking, drug use, and prostitution; and
- organize walking groups for adults in public areas.¹²⁷

There is limited evidence on the success of these strategies, although various neighborhood-based cleanup interventions have been found to increase perceptions of safety and public order.¹²⁸

Heeding the principle of linking informal with formal social control requires that such efforts be supplemented with government support. A promising strategy is to integrate problem solving and community policing. Problem-solving policing focuses police attention on the problems that lie behind crime rather than on the incidents only. Community policing emphasizes the establishment of working partnerships between police and communities to reduce crime and increase security.¹²⁹ The encouraging news is that police efforts to solve local problems in cooperation with residents appears to be working in many large U.S. cities. Skogan, for example, reports large declines in social disorder and crime in a quasi-experimental evaluation of districts where community policing was initiated in Chicago.¹³⁰ Although residents must take partial responsibility for stemming the ever present threat of decay and decline, the best strategy is one that involves both police and residents in planning and executing measures to control crime and restore order in public places.

126. Skogan (1990).

127. See Sampson (1994).

128. Rosenbaum (1986); and Skogan (1990).

129. Moore (1992, p. 99); and chapter 7.

130. Skogan (1996).

Building Informal Social Control

A major dimension of social organization is the ability of a community to supervise and control teenage peer groups. Unruly public behavior by youth is a signal that the neighborhood is losing ground to a peer-controlled system. Policies to encourage informal social control might include

- organized supervision of leisure-time youth activities;
- enforcement of truancy and loitering laws;
- staggered school closing times to reduce thresholds or flash points of peer congregation;
- parent surveillance and involvement in after-school and nighttime youth programs; and
- adult-youth mentoring systems.

The key to these measures is increasing positive intergenerational connections among youth and adults in the community through volunteer efforts. Stricter sanctions such as curfews for adolescents in public areas may also be necessary, but my focus is on informal social controls that arise naturally and positively from ongoing social interactions.¹³¹

Land Use Planning to Promote Community

A consensus is emerging that current zoning and land-use development practices are anticomunity. The peculiar American form of urban sprawl has carved up physical space into isolated pockets, separated social functions, and banished people from public spaces. What Kunstler labels the "new urbanism" is providing fresh ideas on how to reclaim neighborhood environments that naturally foster social interaction and public activities.¹³² Its principles include the neighborhood as the basic unit of planning; limitations on neighborhood size, with well-defined edges and a focused center; and mixed-use facilities and housing for people with different incomes. In addition, buildings should be designed to honor the street as the preeminent form of public space; churches, town halls, schools, and other civic buildings should be placed on preferential sites; and architectural codes should be drawn to preserve landmark buildings. The idea is to produce settings that resemble American towns—whether

131. Sampson (1994).

132. Kunstler (1996).

in the country or in Manhattan. Civic life, in this view, can be encouraged naturally by enlightened zoning and environmental development policies.

Integrating Community with Child Development Policy

Although often neglected in community development policy discussions, there is a strong connection between neighborhood economic disadvantage and such indicators of health and child development as maltreatment, low birthweight babies, and high infant mortality. For these reasons community-based interventions are needed to promote prenatal health care, infant and child health, and support programs for family management (for example, child-rearing skills and conflict resolution). Community interventions of this sort, if successful, are an investment in future generations that will mature over the long run.¹³³

Promoting Housing-Based Neighborhood Stabilization

Although important in themselves, the political economy of cities reminds us that policies on zoning, child health, safety, social order, and community policing need to be coordinated with efforts to preserve residential stability and otherwise improve the social, economic, and physical infrastructure of neighborhoods. That the most promising policies are tied to housing speaks to the relevance of the CDC movement.

One policy option is joint public-private intervention to help stabilize and revitalize deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods. My focus is primarily on investment in the physical structure of declining but still reachable communities. A long history of community-based research shows that population instability and housing decay in poor neighborhoods are linked to crime and other social problems among youth. The implication is that community-based policy interventions are needed to reverse the social deterioration in areas of concentrated poverty. Among others, these policies include

- resident management of public housing,
- tenant buyouts,
- rehabilitation of existing low-income housing,
- strict code enforcement by city government, and
- low-income housing tax credits.

133. Sampson (1992).

By acting to reduce population flight, residential anonymity, and housing deterioration, neighborhood stabilization and ultimately a more cohesive environment for youth socialization will emerge. This strategy is compatible with that of the community development corporations, and there are recent examples that such interventions are viable and in fact have stabilizing effects on communities. Bethel New Life in Chicago, Banana Kelly in New York, New Communities in Newark, Mission Housing in San Francisco, and several other CDC efforts are revitalizing previously deteriorating areas and building social stability and apparently safer neighborhoods in the process.¹³⁴

Deconcentration of Poverty

Housing policies also need to address the virulent forms of racial and economic segregation in many cities. Although community-level interventions cannot change the macroeconomy and declining industrial base in urban America, the ecological concentration of poverty and racial segregation can be addressed in part by two strong strategies: dispersing concentrated public housing and building scattered-site, new, low-income housing. The evidence that dispersement policies and scattered-site housing can work is limited and controversial, and it is certain that public resistance to living near the poor will not disappear.¹³⁵

Still, community development policy and evaluation research are in a position to take advantage of and build on many "natural experiments" going on around the country. For example, the Chicago Housing Authority is embarking on a plan to scatter (on a voluntary basis) some 355 units of the Cabrini-Green project across the city as a means to break down the severe segregation that presently exists. Deteriorating high-rise complexes in other cities are also being scheduled for dispersement. Moreover, there is quasi-experimental evidence that offering inner-city mothers on welfare the opportunity to relocate to more thriving neighborhoods has improved the social outcomes of both the mothers and their children.¹³⁶ These results and opportunities for neighborhood change suggest hope for beneficial outcomes of housing policies that encourage (but do not require) increased neighborhood integration among classes and races.

134. Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan (1996).

135. Massey and Denton (1993).

136. Rosenbaum and Popkin (1991).

Maintaining the Municipal Service Base

Deteriorating city municipal services for public health and fire safety appear to have contributed to the instability of poor communities. As Wallace and Wallace argue based on an analysis of the planned shrinkage of New York City fire and health services in recent decades: "The consequences of withdrawing municipal services from poor neighborhoods, the resulting outbreaks of contagious urban decay and forced migration which shred essential social networks and cause social disintegration, have become a highly significant contributor to decline in public health among the poor."¹³⁷ The loss of social integration and networks from planned shrinkage of services may increase the prevalence of behavioral patterns that may themselves cause further social disintegration. This pattern of destabilizing feedback is central to understanding how government policies foster the downward spiral of low-income, high-crime areas.¹³⁸ Housing and community-based policies should thus be coordinated with policies to maintain fire, sanitation, and other vital municipal services.

Increasing Community Power and Organizational Base

Stable interlocking organizations in a neighborhood are a linchpin of effective community social control. The ability to secure public and private goods and services that are allocated by groups and agencies located outside the neighborhood is another hallmark of effective social organization. It follows that interventions should seek to promote community empowerment through overlapping involvement by residents in local organizations and voluntary associations, horizontal ties among neighborhood institutions, and the vertical integration of local institutions with city hall and other extralocal resources. Although this type of mobilization is obviously difficult and somewhat ambiguous, success at the margins produces cumulative changes that may ultimately promote a more stable and long-lasting community social organization.

137. Wallace and Wallace (1990, p. 427).

138. See Skogan (1986).

Conclusion

Urbanization and modernity notwithstanding, local communities and residential neighborhoods remain a prominent feature of American society. In this chapter I have proposed a community-level framework to explain why. I have explored the meaning, sources, and consequences of what communities supply from the perspective of a theory of social capital and collective efficacy. I have discussed also what knowledge is still needed from research and what policy directions are implied by a focus on community social organization for the common good.

It is appropriate to close, however, with some words of caution on the limits of community. Achieving common goals in an increasingly diverse society is no easy task and has proven a problem for communitarian thinking in an age of individual rights.¹³⁹ In the pursuit of informal social control and collective goods, there is always the danger that freedoms will be restricted unnecessarily, that people will face unwanted and even unjust scrutiny. For example, surveillance of "suspicious" persons in socially controlled communities can easily become translated into the wholesale interrogation of racial minorities.¹⁴⁰ Suppose further that a community comes together with high social capital and cohesion to block the residential entry of a racial group. Put more bluntly, what if racism is a shared value among residents of certain neighborhoods? Such exclusion happens too often, prompting Surtles to warn of the dark side of "defended neighborhoods."¹⁴¹

Consider also the historical connection between official corruption and local solidarity. William Whyte was one of the first to document the ironic consequences of dense, multiple relationships in cohesive communities for law enforcement. "The policeman who takes a strictly legalistic view of his duties cuts himself off from the personal relations necessary to enable him to serve as a mediator of disputes in his area." By contrast, "the policeman who develops close ties with local people is unable to act against them with the vigor prescribed by the law."¹⁴² It follows that police corruption is an ever present danger under conditions of high social capital even as it aids in dispute resolution and informal social control be-

139. Selznick (1992); and Etzioni (1996).

140. Skogan (1990).

141. Surtles (1972).

142. Whyte (1943, p. 126).

cause of interlocking social ties. It was the nature of such corruption that originally led to decentralized policing and an emergency-based patrol response in which officers were randomly assigned across neighborhoods.¹⁴³ The nationwide move to embrace community policing has perhaps not recognized the risks inherent in the community side of the equation.

Obviously, Americans would not do well to think of racism, norms of social exclusion, and instruments of corruption as desirable forms of social capital, and we must balance community with a normative conception of social justice. It is for this reason that I have focused on widely expressed desires regarding community—especially social order and public safety. My strategy relies on a vision of urban America based on shared values for a safe and healthy environment, not on policies that divide by race and class. Nonetheless, pursuit of community goals must proceed cautiously and with respect for individual rights, diversity, and limits on state power. Fortunately, legal justice and community are not the antinomy common wisdom suggests.¹⁴⁴ Constitutional law has long been concerned with balancing individual rights against the need to promote the health and safety of communities. The very idea of police power suggests the tension, long recognized by the Supreme Court, between individual rights and the pursuit of social order.¹⁴⁵ Bringing law and social justice back into discussions of community development is a welcome and necessary move in the attempt to unite diversity in the name of community.¹⁴⁶

Finally, I caution against falling into the trap of local determinism. Part of the appeal of community is the image of local residents working collectively to solve their own problems. A defining part of American tradition (nostalgia?) is to hold individuals as well as communities responsible for their own fate.¹⁴⁷ Like Saul Alinsky, I too have embraced the American ideal of residents joining forces to build community and maintain social order. This is not the only or even the most important story, however. As I have been at pains to emphasize, what happens within neighborhoods is in large part shaped by extralocal social forces and the political economy. In addition to encouraging communities to mobilize via self-help strategies of informal social control, it is incumbent on government to mount

143. Wilson (1968).

144. See Selznick (1992).

145. Gillman (1996).

146. See also Pursell (1996).

147. Suttles (1972).

aggressive strategies to address the social and ecological changes that have battered inner-city communities. The specific nature of such efforts is beyond the scope of this chapter, but that should not detract from the importance of restorative moves at the political and macrosocial level. Recognizing that community social action matters, in other words, does not absolve society of the responsibility for seeking equality of opportunities at the neighborhood as well as the individual level.

COMMENT BY

James P. Connell

I have been invited to comment on Robert Sampson's chapter and to share some of my thinking on community change in support of youth development. Sampson's research on how the social conditions of neighborhoods affect youth crime has already influenced our work at the Institute for Research and Reform in Education and the youth development field more generally.¹⁴⁸ His work continues to shape our thinking as we refine our emerging theory of change for community-based youth initiatives.¹⁴⁹ His discussion here incorporates many of the fundamental points that have established him as such an influential and important thinker in the field.

Sampson makes two primary contributions that will help this volume make the connection between research and community development policy. First, his discussion includes several traditions of social theory that should be recognized and can enrich thinking about community development policy. His fresh insights about the potential and limits of social capital theories to inform social policy, for example, honor the classics in the field. At the same time, he respectfully and effectively takes them to task. Second, he moves at a good pace and with a steady hand from theoretical exposition to his careful interpretation of research and then on to practical implications for community development policy and practice. This is a lot of ground to cover, and Sampson does it well.

As Alice O'Connor and others in this volume remind us, the applied and policy fields have their own traditions, ones that with careful study should provide important signposts to direct our current and future re-

148. See Public/Private Ventures (1995).

149. Connell and Gambone (1998).

search efforts.¹⁵⁰ This volume must help generate a knowledge base that reflects those traditions and contemporary theory and research if it is to be truly useful in policy development. Sampson's approach contributes to a comprehensive view of the traditions affecting our understanding of how communities can support or undermine the development of their youth.

I also applaud Sampson's decision to take a more narrow view of social capital than is currently popular. He moves to the forefront those components of social capital—for example, public goods—that deserve most attention. By focusing on these specific dimensions of social capital he increases the feasibility and appeal of his policy and program recommendations, most of which make eminent good sense.

Sampson's contributions to our knowledge of how community conditions affect residents can enrich and make more compelling the theories of change that scholars develop to guide initiatives aimed at improving the lives of youth in economically disadvantaged communities. Now the question is how to transform this knowledge into practical steps that community-based coalitions can take and then assess for their effectiveness.

At the Institute for Research and Reform in Education my colleagues and I have drawn on recent reviews of this knowledge base as it pertains to the development of young people aged ten to eighteen in urban communities to develop the framework shown in figure 6-1.¹⁵¹ We hope that this framework will prove useful to community stakeholders as well as policy, research, and evaluation audiences.¹⁵²

A Community Action Framework for Youth Development


The framework presented in figure 6-1 is meant to be both practical and research based. Thus, where research or strong theory is lacking, my colleagues and I have called on common sense and practical experience to fill in the gaps. To derive this framework we began at the end, asking what long-term outcomes we wanted for young people. We then moved back, step by step, through a process that allowed us to define the changes needed to achieve those goals. James Connell and Anne Kubisch describe

150. Connell and others (1995).

151. Connell, Aber, and Walker (1995); and Gambone (1998).

152. Connell and Gambone (1998).

Figure 6-1. A Community Action Framework for Youth Development



Source: Connell and Gambone (1998).

in detail the advantages and challenges of articulating a theory of change in this way for all comprehensive community initiatives.¹⁵³

Setting Our Sights

According to the framework, the long-term goals of community-based youth initiatives are to bring about meaningful improvement in the life chances of young people to become economically self-sufficient, be healthy, have good family and social relationships, and contribute to their community. The commonsense indicators for each of these long-term outcomes are as follows.

—For economic self-sufficiency, all youth should expect as adults to be able to support themselves and their families and to have some discretionary resources beyond those it takes to put food on the table. They should have a decent job and enough education or access to education to improve or change jobs.

—For overall health and good family and social relationships, young people should grow up physically and mentally healthy, be good caregivers for their children, and have positive and dependable family and friendship networks.

—Contributions to community could come in many forms, but we look to our young people to become more than taxpayers and law abiders, to give something back in labor, time, or material resources that is beyond legal requirements and that indicates their connection to a common good larger than their own.

By emphasizing these positive indicators, I do not mean to exclude adverse markers of outcomes in these three areas. Meaningful decreases in welfare rolls, behavior-based physical and mental health problems, child abuse and neglect, and incidences of violent crimes are important but less ambitious indicators of these same outcomes.

Our review of research suggests that for these goals to be achievable, young people have to accomplish certain things as they move from childhood through adolescence.¹⁵⁴

—They must learn to be productive, do well in school, develop outside interests and basic life skills, and get ready to enter the world of work.

—They must learn to connect to adults in their families and community, to their peers in positive and supportive ways, to their own unique identities, and to something larger than themselves.

153. Connell and Kubisch (1998).

154. Connell, Aber, and Walker (1995); and Gambone (1998).

—They must learn to navigate, to become captains of their own ships. This third task takes multiple forms. First, they must learn to navigate the lures of unhealthy and dangerous behaviors and the challenges of inequities, rejections, and failures, dangers that all youth face but are much more prevalent in the lives of children living in economically disadvantaged circumstances. Second, they must learn to navigate among their multiple worlds: their peer groups, families, and schools, where different ways of behaving must be learned and, in some cases, different languages must be spoken and understood. Third, they must learn to navigate the developmental transitions from being children to being potential parents and from needing just to learn about the world to getting to know themselves and their role in the world.

Deciding What Matters for Youth

The framework asserts that for youth to learn to be productive, be connected, and navigate challenges effectively, they must have supports and opportunities in the settings in which they spend their time. Specifically, they need

—multiple, supportive relationships with adults and peers;

—meaningful opportunities for involvement and membership;

—challenging and engaging activities and learning experiences;

—physical and emotional safety; and

—adequate nutrition, health care, and shelter.

According to the framework, if these supports and opportunities are provided consistently, dramatic and immediate improvements will occur in how productive and connected and able to navigate young people are, and in the longer term they will be more successful as adults. Conversely, if these investments in youth are not made, the United States will continue to see a growing proportion of young people move into adulthood at best ill equipped to achieve the goals defined in the framework and at worst dangerous to themselves and others.

What Must Communities Do to Deliver the Goods?

What are the community strategies needed to provide these supports and opportunities to all youth? First, strengthen the capacities of adults who live and work with young people to provide them with supports and op-

portunities. History, research, and common sense tell us that adults cannot program or service young people into healthy development. Programs and services clearly have their place, but without caregivers, neighbors, and employers of young people providing these supports and opportunities at home, in their neighborhoods, and at work, adults' impact on the lives of a community's youth will be minimal. Sampson's thinking and research loom large here.

Second, communities must integrate and reform the large institutions and systems that affect young people. Changes in how schools and the educational systems are structured, how they relate to the communities in which they are located, and how teaching and learning occur should lead to better supports and opportunities for young people.¹⁵⁵ Also needed are improvements in juvenile justice, health services, social services, housing, and parks and recreation. This book includes many examples of how these institutions and services can integrate their efforts on behalf of young people and work in ways that are more focused on neighborhoods and more responsive to communities.

Third, communities must increase the number and quality of developmental activities available for young people before and after school, on weekends and holidays, and during the summer. Social-recreational, athletic, cultural, educational, and spiritual community-based activities need to be strengthened and made more accessible. By evaluating these activities in terms of the supports and opportunities they provide, their designers, operators, and consumers gain a standard to use in assessing their strength and in making adjustments to maximize their value.

Finally, policies and resources in the public and private sector must be realigned to support carrying out the strategies I have described. History and common sense again make it clear that political, economic, and human resources will have to be realigned if these strategies are to have any chance of being implemented. Similarly, there are existing public and private policies—governmental, philanthropic, and business—that will need to change to allow these realignments to occur.

Certainly, some additional resources will be necessary to support putting these community action strategies into practice. But from a political and practical standpoint, realignment of existing resources is needed first to move them from sustaining current practices toward encouraging and supporting better practices; from “fixing” what is wrong with young peo-

ple, their families, and their neighborhoods to supporting their growth and development; and from no-strings-attached investments in delivering services and programs to standards- and results-based investments in the young.

Creating the Climate and Capacity for Change

Finally, the framework calls for communities to mobilize diverse stakeholders to take part in the design and implementation of these strategies. The framework suggests that achieving this participation will require diverse community constituencies to build their awareness, knowledge, engagement, and commitment to carry out these community action strategies. In addition, these mobilization efforts should seek to maximize four conditions that research on community and systems change and experience suggest must be present for meaningful change to occur and be sustained:

- a sense of urgency, that the risk for the community and youth of implementing these strategies is far less than the risk of continuing business as usual;

- a sense of possibility, that these strategies can be implemented in a given community and, when they are, young people will receive the necessary and sufficient supports and opportunities to be successful;

- a sense of equity, the knowledge and belief that all stakeholders in youth development—youth *and* adults, adults who are raising and working with children *and* those who are not, those running large institutions *and* those working in them, those elected by citizens *and* those who elect them—will share in the pain and the gain of change; and

- a sense of inevitability: the belief that if community efforts on behalf of youth are tied together by a common purpose and by a clear, shared, and public framework for change and accountability, this initiative will survive changing leadership and diverse personalities, the results of elections, and shifts in economic circumstances. Community stakeholders need to believe that this, too, will *not* pass.

Final Thoughts

The ongoing efforts of Robert Sampson and others in this volume to create a bridge between researchers and those making and carrying out policy in urban communities are crucial. By developing this discourse—in

155. See the authors in this volume; and Connell (1997).

this case about our knowledge of what communities can provide to youth—these researchers invite others working at the intersection of youth and community development to broaden the bridge by creating an ever more practical and compelling discourse to guide policy and practice. I hope the framework presented here contributes to this process, simplifying and broadening the impact of the insights gained from Sampson's chapter and the others without distorting their findings. At the same time, I hope to have added a piece to the bridge that is useful to community decisionmakers and energizing to those who must implement their decisions.

To make this exchange even more fruitful, I invite researchers such as Sampson to train their scientific sights on efforts in various neighborhoods and larger communities to put elements of this framework and others like it into practice. We will need to distill new theories and generalizable empirical findings from what will undoubtedly be a complex web of local experiments with important implications for the future of our youth and our society.

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Security and Community Development

Mark H. Moore

Security is vital to communities. Without it, everyday life is, as Thomas Hobbes wrote, "nasty, brutish and short."¹ Among the threats that people face, the threat of criminal attack seems particularly salient.² Those whose future is threatened have little incentive to invest: they buy merchandise rather than property and recreation rather than education.³ Instead of developing the trusting relationships that form the heart of strong communities, they become suspicious and exploitative.⁴ In these important ways crime could be said to cause poverty as well as the other way around.⁵

1. Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan*. For a contemporary account of a community that has far too little order and the security it can produce, see Kotlowitz (1991).
2. Garofalo (1981, pp. 839–57).
3. Edward C. Banfield thought that excessive "present-orientation" among residents was one of the most important explanations for conditions in poor neighborhoods. See Banfield (1968, pp. 46–54). It is possible, of course, that this present-orientation is not a trait that individuals have from the outset, but that it is influenced by the conditions in which they find themselves.
4. As John Dilulio (1989, p. 32) observes: "When underclass citizens do not bother to make that extra (or perhaps first) dollar, it is because they quite literally have reason to fear getting mugged for it. And when they display cavalier and callous attitudes toward their friends and relatives, it is because they live in an environment in which any display of 'normal' middle class sensibilities may make one a target of street level predators who truly do think and behave differently from the rest of us." Edward Banfield has also developed this theme in *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1967) and *The Unheavenly City* (1968).
5. James B. Stewart (1986, pp. 6–10) first popularized this idea. Wesley Skogan (1990) offered some evidence suggesting this relationship might be true.